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Trust Revocation: Do Trust Terms
Prevail Over California Civil Code
Section 2280?
Trusts in real property or personalty may be either inter vivos, which
take effect during the lifetime of the settlor, or testamentary, which
take effect upon the death of the settlor. An inter vivos trust' may
be either revocable2 or irrevocable.' A power of revocation can be
created either by the settlor in the trust instrument or by operation
of law. Once a power of revocation exists, several ways to accomplish
revocation are possible in California. If the terms of the trust do
not specify a revocation method, California Civil Code section 2280,
(hereinafter section 2280) allows the trustor to revoke by filing a writing
with the trustee. A problem arises when a trust specifies a method
of revocation that requires a different procedure than that of section
2280. If the trustor attempts to revoke by complying with section 2280,
the validity of the attempted revocation is in question because the
revocation does not comply with the strict terms of the trust. In cer-
tain situations, requiring strict compliance with trust revocation terms
leads to unfair results, defeating some of the purposes of creating
a revocable trust.
Typically, litigation arises when the administrator or executor of
the estate of a decedent sues the trustee of an inter vivos trust created
by the decedent.' The plaintiff claims that the decedent-trustor had
successfully revoked the trust. The issue in these cases is whether title
to the trust property passed to the estate.
1. This comment will discuss only inter vivos trusts.
2. The term "revocable trust" means a trust in which the settlor reserves the power to
revoke the trust. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY at 1187 (5th ed. 1979).
3. The term "irrevocable trust" means a trust in which the settlor has no power to terminate
the trust. Id. at 744.
4. Unless otherwise specified, all references to the Civil Code in this comment are to
California Civil Code section 2280, which states:
Unless expressly made irrevocable by the instrument creating the trust, every volun-
tary trust shall be revocable by the trustor by writing filed with the trustee. When
a voluntary trust is revoked by the trustor, the trustee shall transfer to the trustor
its full title to the trust estate. Trusts created prior to the date when this act shall
become a law shall not be affected hereby.
CAL. Cry. CODE §2280.
5. See, e.g., Rosenauer v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 30 Cal. App. 3d 300, 301, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 321, 322 (1973).
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The California appellate courts have reached conflicting results on
the issue of the validity of an attempted revocation under section 2280
that does not comply with the strict terms of the trust.6 This com-
ment will suggest a resolution of the controversy after examining im-
portant principles of trust law, statutory construction, equity, and
public policy.' Examining these principles will show that a flexible
approach toward revocation provides a more fair result.
A trust revocation should be valid if the method complies with sec-
tion 2280 even though the method does not comply with the terms
of the trust. Strict compliance with the trust revocation method does
not always produce the better result. This comment describes cir-
cumstances in which permitting revocation by compliance with sec-
tion 2280 is more equitable.' The trustor should not be locked into
a formalized revocation procedure that may have been included in
the trust instrument without proper reflection. A requirement of strict
compliance with the trust terms is especially unfair for a revocation
that would have been valid under section 2280 had the trust been
silent or ambiguous about the revocation procedure.
THE REQUIREMENT OF STRICT COMPLIANCE
WITH THE TERMS OF A TRUST
A requirement of strict compliance with the trust terms in order
to revoke a trust can lead to unjust results. Often, technical omis-
sions on the part of the trustor will operate to frustrate the actual
intent of the trustor. One illustration of this type of situation is found
in the case of Hibernia Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank.'
In Hibernia, the trustor created a revocable inter vivos trust but
later decided that she no longer wanted the primary beneficiary to
benefit from the trust."0 While confined to the hospital during her
last illness, the trustor executed a writing manifesting a clear intent
6. Compare Fernald v. Lawsten, 26 Cal. App. 2d 552, 561, 79 P.2d 742, 747 (1938)
and Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. McGraw, 72 Cal. App. 2d 390, 399, 164 P.2d 846, 850-51 (1945)
(examples of revocation upheld) with Rosenauer, 30 Cal. App. 3d 300, 106 Cal. Rptr.
321, 323 and Hibernia Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank, 66 Cal. App. 3d 399, 404, 136 Cal. Rptr.
60, 63 (1977) (examples of revocation denied).
7. See infra notes 17-38 and accompanying text (discussion of trust law principles); notes
96-108 and accompanying text (discussion of statutory construction rules); notes 109-13 and
accompanying text (discussion of equity principles); and notes 114-28 and accompanying text
(discussion of policy principles).
8. See infra notes 83-95 and accompanying text (analysis of cases).
9. 66 Cal. App. 3d 399, 136 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1977).
10. Id. at 401-02, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 60-61.
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to revoke the trust." The writing satisfied Civil Code section 2280
but failed to comply with certain detailed provisions'2 for revocation
contained in the trust. Because of the noncompliance by the trustor
with the strict provisions of the trust, the court held that the revoca-
tion was ineffective.'
3
By refusing to treat these actions as constituting a valid revoca-
tion, the court frustrated the clear intent of the trustor.1' Further-
more, refusal to recognize a revocation here undermines the intent
of the legislature in enacting the trust revocation procedure in section
2280.'1 Refusal to validate the revocation also detracts from recognized
policy considerations and equity principles, both of which underlie
modern California trust law.' 6 Situations like that involved in the
Hibernia case deserve careful balancing of competing interests, to avoid
unjust results that frustrate the intent of the trustor, while not pro-
moting opposing policies. Before analyzing these opposing considera-
tions, this comment will examine important trust principles.
APPLICABLE TRUST PRINCIPLES
No particular language is necessary to create a trust, and the words
"trust" or "trustee" need not be used for a court to find that a trust
exists." The California Civil Code, however, does define the minimum
requirements for trust formation.'" If evidence exists that the creation
11. See infra note 118 and accompanying text, discussing importance of respecting intent
of trustor to revoke. Id.
12. The provisions not satisfied in Hibernia dealt with notice to trustee (Hibernia, 66 Cal.
App. 3d at 402, 403, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 62). One commentator suggests that this type of flaw
in the attempted revocation should not always defeat the validity of the revocation. See infra
notes 122-24 and accompanying text (discussion of revocation provisions solely for benefit of
trustee).
13. Hibernia, 66 Cal. App. 3d 399, 404, 136 Cal. Rptr. 60, 63 (1977).
14. See infra note 118 and accompanying text (discussion of intent of trustor).
15. See infra notes 96-108 and accompanying text (discussion of rules of statutory con-
struction leading to presumption that, in amending section 2280 to its current form, the legislature
intended to liberalize revocation in California).
16. See infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text (discussion of equity principles); and
see infra notes 114-28 and accompanying text (discussion of policy considerations).
17. See McGraw, 72 Cal. App. 2d at 398, 164 P.2d at 850 (trust found in conveyance
of property to defendant under circumstances that negated an inference of intent to convey
title absolutely) (citing Weiner v. Mullaney, 59 Cal. App. 2d 620, 631, 140 P.2d 704, 710 (1943)
and Hardison v. Corbett, 55 Cal. App. 2d 310, 318, 130 P.2d 226, 230 (1942)); Wells Fargo
Bank v. Greuner, 226 Cal. App. 2d 454, 460, 38 Cal. Rptr. 132, 135 (1964) (voluntary trust
arose when father assigned life insurance policies to son, who orally agreed to put policies
in trust for benefit of family of father, even though son gave no consideration and paid no
premiums).
18. CAL. CIv. CODE §222 provides in part,
a voluntary trust is created, as to the trustor and beneficiary, by any words
or acts of the trustor, indicating with reasonable certainty: 1. An intention on the
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of the trust is a result of fraud, duress, undue influence, or mistake, the
settlor or his successors in interest may have the trust rescinded.' 9
The validity of the trust also depends upon the state of the title in the
trust property. A major identifying feature of a trust is the separation
of legal and equitable or beneficial title in the subject matter of the trust.2"
Legal title is held by the trustee, and equitable title is held by the
beneficiary.2' If, after creation of the trust, the legal title and beneficial
interest become vested in one person, as is the case when the sole
beneficiary becomes the sole trustee, the equitable doctrine of merger
may apply to terminate the trust since no purpose of the settlor can be
achieved by continuing the trust.22
Since the courts can apply the merger doctrine whenever the sole
beneficiary becomes the sole trustee, equity permits a settlor to revoke
a trust in which he has the power to modify the trust and make himself
the sole beneficiary and sole trustee.23 In this situation, if Civil Code
section 2280 is satisfied, the revocation should be upheld despite failure
to comply strictly with the trust terms, since the trust could have been
terminated by merger. Another way for a trust to be terminated is through
revocation by the settlor.
A. Power of Revocation Generally
If the settlor exercises a power of revocation, the trust property reverts
to the trustor or the estate of the trustor, in the absence of an express
provision to the contrary.2 ' Powers of revocation are a valuable tool in
part of the trustor to create a trust; and 2. The subject, purpose, and beneficiary
of the trust.
CAL. CIV. CODE §2216 defines a voluntary trust as "... an obligation arising out of a personal
confidence reposed in, and voluntarily accepted by, one for the benefit of another."
19. See A. Scott, The Law of Trusts §329A, at 2593 (1967); see also CAL. CIV. CODE
§1640, providing that "[w]hen, through fraud, mistake, or accident, a written contract [e.g.,
trust] fails to express the real intention of the parties, such intention is to be regarded, and
the erroneous parts of the writing disregarded." This comment assumes that all trusts were
validly created but that the trustor later changed his mind and wished to revoke the trust.
20. Craven v. Dominguez Estate Co., 72 Cal. App. 713, 717-18, 237 P. 821, 823 (1925);
see also CAL. CIV. CODE §863, which provides in part, "[E]very express trust . . . vests the
whole estate in the Trustees, subject only to the execution of the trust. The beneficiaries take
no estate or interest in the property, but may enforce the performance of the trust."
21. The beneficiary is often the same person as the trustor.
22. The doctrine of merger operates to terminate a trust since the continued existence of
a trust depends on the separation of legal and equitable title in the trust property. Estate of
Washburn, 11 Cal. App. 735, 746, 106 P. 415, 420 (1909); see also CAL. CIV. CODE §2279,
providing for extinction of a trust by the entire fulfillment of the object of the trust.
23. See infra note 117 and accompanying text (discussion of power of trustor to extinguish
interests of beneficiaries).
24. See Mallon v. Long Beach, 44 Cal. 2d 199, 208, 282 P.2d 481, 487 (1955) (trust in
lands granted to city reclaimed by state for application to other uses); see also CAL. CIV. CODn
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the flexible estate plan for several reasons.25 Approaches to revocability
vary in different jurisdictions, however.
1. Majority view
Despite the many advantages of powers of revocation, most jurisdic-
tions do not favor flexible revocation procedures. Under the common
law and majority view in the United States, the settlor has no power to
revoke a trust and compel reconveyance of the res26 without expressly
reserving such a power in the trust instrument.27 The Restatement of
Trusts follows the majority view.21
The rationale for the majority view on revocability is that the crea-
tion of a trust amounts to a conveyance of property, and a change
§2280. The process of revocation should be distinguished from the process of extinction. Revoca-
tion occurs when the settlor voluntarily exercises a power of revocation. See supra note I and
accompanying text; see, e.g., Fleishman v. Blechman, 148 Cal. App. 2d 88, 95, 306 P.2d 548,
552 (1957). Extinction occurs when the trust purpose has been fulfilled or becomes impossible
or illegal. See CAL. CiV. CODE §2279, providing that "[a] trust is extinguished by the entire
fulfillment of its object, or by such object becoming impossible or unlawful."
25. A primary advantage is that the trust may provide for distribution of the trust prop-
erty to the beneficiaries upon the death of the settlor without becoming part of the probate
estate. See generally Keydel, Advantages of the Revocable Trust Estate Plan, 54 MICH. ST.
B.J. 22 (1975). For a discussion of tax implications, see generally Sacher, Estate Planning and
the Partially Irrevocable Trust: Another View of United States v. Byrum, 48 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 581 (1973). For irrevocable trusts, if the settlor retains no interest in the trust the income
is taxed to the beneficiaries or to the trust itself, but gift tax may attach to the donor. See
G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS §148, at 535 n.13, 536 n.14 (1973). State law controls the question
of revocability for purposes of determining federal tax consequences. See Filtcroft v. Comm'r
of Int'l Rev., 328 F.2d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1964). For an article that addresses one aspect of
taxes in California trust law, see Note, Trusts: Power To Revoke In Part As Including Power
To Terminate, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 556, 559-60 (1957). See generally Miller and Rainey, Dying
With the "Living" (or "Revocable") Trust: Federal Tax Consequences of Testamentary Disposi-
tions Compared, 37 VAND. L. REv. 811 (1984); and Desmond, Revocable Trust After Death
of Grantor, 116 TR. & EsT. 218 (1977) (tax consequences of the revocable trust).
26. Subject matter. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 1172 (5th ed. 1979).
27. See G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS §148, at 531 (1973); see also A. SCOTT, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS §329A, at 2593-95 (1967). One commentator suggests that the rule in favor of
irrevocability can be traced to early English common law and is probably derived from the
general law of gifts. G. Bird, Commentary, Trust Termination: Unborn, Living, and Dead
Hands-Too Many Fingers in the Trust Pie, 36 HAsTiNGs LAW J. 565 n.5 (1985).
28. RESTATEHENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs §330 (1957) provides:
(I) The settlor has power to revoke the trust if and to the extent that by the terms
of the trust he reserved such a power.
(2) Except as stated in §§332 [power of revocation or modification omitted by mistake]
and 333 [rescission and reformation), the settlor cannot revoke the trust if by the
terms of the trust he did not reserve a power of revocation.
Bogert suggests that if no procedure for termination of the trust is prescribed, the power
of revocation may be exercised in any reasonable manner that sufficiently evidences the inten-
tion of the settlor to revoke the trust. BOGERT, LAW OF TRusTs §148, at 535 (1973); see also
A. ScoTT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS §§330.7 at 2605 n.1 (1967); see, e.g., ScoTT at §331.1, at
2621 n.2, citing Lambdin v. Dantzbecker, 169 Md. 240, 181 A. 353, 102 A.L.R. 277 (1935);
Security Trust Co. v. Spruance, 20 Del. Ch. 195, 174 A. 285 (1934) (execution of new trust
instrument declaring a trust on different terms was a sufficient revocation of earlier trust).
A trust may not be terminated by a mere oral declaration of the trustor. Taylor v. Bunnell,
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of mind or dissatisfaction with the operation of the trust is not con-
sidered a valid reason to permit revocation absent an express provi-
sion.29 Even under the majority view, however, "terms of the trust"
is broadly interpreted by courts. Thus, the phrase usually means any
manifestation of intent by the settlor that admits of proof in judicial
proceedings." Therefore, even under the more restrictive view, courts
recognize the need to promote respect for the intent of the trustor
and free alienability of property.3'
2. Minority view
A few states, including California, make a voluntary trust revocable3 2
by the settlor unless expressly made irrevocable. This view reverses
the common law and opposes the majority United States view. 3 The
minority view is that a trust is presumed revocable absent express
language to the contrary. In California, section 2280 of the Civil Code
codifies this view.
a. Civil Code Section 2280
As enacted in 1872, California Civil Code section 2280 provided
that a trust agreement that did not specify a manner of revocation
was deemed irrevocable.3" This original version of the California Civil
Code section was identical to the present majority view. 35 In 1931,
133 Cal. App. 177, 180, 23 P.2d 1062, 1063 (1933). If the trust consists of an interest in land,
the Statute of Frauds requires that extinguishment be done in writing. A. Scorr, TiE LAW
OF TRUSTS §343.1, at 2733. In California this rule is embodied in CAL. CIv. CODE §2280 (trust
revoked by writing delivered to trustee).
29. See G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS §148, at 531 (1973); A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
§329A, at 2593-95 (1967).
30. A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §330, at 2595 (1967).
31. The majority rule on revocability does not apply to Totten, or bank account, trusts,
because a power to revoke them is generally implied. G. BOcERT, LAW OF TRUSTS §148, at
532 n.84 (1973) (citing Stipe v. First Nat'l Bank, 208 Or. 251, 301 P.2d 175); id. §20, at 47
n.81 (citing Evinger v. MacDougall, 28 Cal. App. 2d 175, 82 P.2d 194 (1938)).
32. Mallon, 44 Cal. 2d 199, 282 P. 2d 481 (1955); see supra'note 24 and accompanying text.
33. According to a recent survey of trust authorities, the only states to follow the minority
view are California (see CAL. CIV. CODE §2280), Oklahoma (see STATS. 1941, tit. 60, §175.41),
and Texas (see TEx. TRUST CODE §112.051). A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §330.1, at 2598
& n.6 (1967 & Supp. 1984).
34. The original code section read,
A trust cannot be revoked by the trustor after its acceptance, actual or presumed,
by the trustee and beneficiaries, except by the consent of all the beneficiaries, unless
the declaration of trust reserves a power of revocation to the trustor, and in that
case the .power must be strictly pursued.
Tit. VIII, ch. 1, art. V (1872).
35. CAL. Civ. CODE §2280. See, e.g., Gray v. Union Trust Co., 171 Cal. 637, 154 P.
306 (1915); see generally Comment, Trusts and Trustees: Recent Developments in the Tentative
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however, the California Legislature amended the code section to pro-
vide that "[u]nless expressly made irrevocable by the instrument
creating the trust, every voluntary trust shall be revocable by the trustor
by writing filed with the trustee .. ."3 Thus, the 1931 amendment
to Civil Code section 2280 reverses the California presumption on
revocability.
If the trustor and trustee are not the same person, section 2280
must be satisfied to effect a valid revocation.37 Under section 2280,
a trust is presumed revocable if the trust instrument does not expressly
make the trust irrevocable, despite evidence that the trustor intended
the trust to be irrevocable.3" The presumption of revocability indicates
legislative intent to treat trust revocation in a more flexible manner.
In addition, this view supports the goal of free alienability of prop-
erty advocated by this comment. The case law interpretation of sec-
tion 2280 is also important to this discussion.
CALiFoRNIA CASE LAw
California appellate courts have reached conflicting results as to
whether strict compliance with the revocation method specified in the
trust instrument is necessary to effect a valid revocation.39 To
demonstrate this conflict, this section will discuss four cases in which
the trustor attempted revocation by a method that satisfied section
Trust Doctrine: Influence of Civil Code §2280 on the California Law, 28 CALIF. L. REV. 202
(1940).
36. The entire code section, which has remained unamended since 1931, states:
Unless expressly made irrevocable by the instrument creating the trust, every volun-
tary trust shall be revocable by the trustor by writing filed with the trustee. When
a voluntary trust is revoked by the trustor, the trustee shall transfer to the trustor
its full title to the trust estate. Trusts created prior to the date when this act shall
become a law shall not be affected hereby.
CAL. CIV. CODE §2280. In an earlier version of the bill, no revocation method was specified.
In the final chaptered version, however, the legislature inserted a specific revocation method,
"by writing filed with the trustee." 1931 Cal. Stat., c. 950, §1 at 1955 (amending CAL. Clv.
CODE §2280, May 5, 1931 amended version). Thus, the 1931 amendment, still in effect at this
writing, provides a specific method of revocation sufficient to meet the Statute of Frauds. (Recall
that an interest in land can be neither created nor extinguished orally. See supra note 28).
37. Miller v. Miller, 217 Cal. App. 2d 538, 544, 31 Cal. Rptr. 618, 622 (1963).
38. Gaylord v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 153 F.2d 408, 414-15 (9th Cir. 1946) (revocability
of trust not affected by fact that trustor referred to it as irrevocable in federal gift tax returns).
"Expressly," for purposes of section 2280, means distinctly, clearly, unmistakably, or in direct
terms, as distinguished from impliedly or inferentially. Newman v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 222
F.2d 131, 135 (9th Cir. 1955). Even with a trust agreement that made the trust irrevocable
during a given time period following the death of named persons, one case held that the trust
was still revocable because the trust had not expressly been made irrevocable within the mean-
ing of section 2280. Wells Fargo, 226 Cal. App. 2d at 458-59, 38 Cal. Rptr. 132, 134-35 (1964).
39. See supra note 6.
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2280 but did not satisfy the revocation procedure specified in the trust.
Analysis of the conflicting cases and application of the trust prin-
ciples discussed will show that the cases adopting a more flexible
revocation approach are the better reasoned decisions.
A. Fernald v. Lawsten
Fernald v. Lawsten" was the first case to address the validity of
a trust revocation meeting Civil Code section 2280 after the code sec-
tion was amended in 1931. As discussed above, the amendment creates
a presumption that trusts are revocable unless expressly made ir-
revocable.' The amendment thus reversed the original version of the
code section. 2
The Fernald trustor, an elderly woman, provided in her trust that
the trustee, a male neighbor, was to hold title to the trust property
in his name and retain possession during her lifetime unless the parties
agreed otherwise in writing. 3 Two years after creating the trust, the
trustor decided that her attorneys had been correct in advising against
allowing her property to be controlled by another person. Accordingly,
the trustor revoked the trust by notifying the trustee in writing, as
provided by section 2280.""
The Fernald court held that a valid revocation had occurred, stating
that since the statute provided a specific procedure for revoking a
voluntary trust, the statutory method should prevail over an agree-
ment between the parties to the contrary. 5 The court reasoned that
although the trust instrument expressly provided a method of revoca-
tion, the provision did not declare affirmatively that the trust could
not be terminated in a manner other than by agreement of the par-
ties in writing." Thus, the trust was revocable in accordance with
section 2280.11 This reasoning suggests that the Fernald court would
require a provision stating that the trust revocation method was the
exclusive method contemplated by the parties before denying revoca-
tion pursuant to section 2280.
40. 26 Cal. App. 2d 552, 79 P.2d 742 (1938).
41. CAL. Crv. CODE §2280 provides in pertinent part: "Unless expressly made irrevocable
by the instrument creating the trust, every voluntary trust shall be revocable by the trustor.
." CAL. Civ. CODE §2280.
42. Compare 1872 Cal. Stat. c. - (enacting Cal. Civ. Code §2280) with CAL. CIV. CODE
§2280, set forth in full at supra note 4.
43. Fernald, 26 Cal. App. 2d at 557-58, 79 P.2d at 745.
44. Id. at 558, 79 P.2d at 745.
45. See id. at 561, 79 P.2d at 747.
46. Id. at 560, 79 P.2d at 746-47.
47. Id. at 560-61, 79 P.2d at 746-47.
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The Fernald rule implies that satisfaction of the code section may
in some cases be enough to uphold a revocation that did not comply
strictly with the trust revocation procedure. 8 Thus, in the Hibernia49
case, the trustor would have effected a valid revocation under the
Fernald rule. Allowing revocation under the facts of Hibernia seems
to be a fair result, especially when the trustor clearly intended to
revoke.
B. Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. McGraw
In Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. McGraw,5" the trustor retained in the
documents the right to require the trust property to be sold, and to revoke
by ordering a sale and instructing the trustee to pay the proceeds to her. 5'
The plaintiff trustor contended that revocation was accomplished when
she served a written "notice of rescission" on the trustee, rescinding all
prior agreements between them, including the declaration of trust. 2 Con-
trary to the trust terms, however, the trustor did not order a sale of the
property. The court upheld the revocation even though the trustor had
not complied precisely with the trust terms. 53 The court reached this result
by comparing the facts to those in Fernald v. Lawsten. 4 The McGraw
court held that, as was the case in Fernald, compliance with section 2280
was present and this was sufficient grounds for validating the McGraw
revocation.55 Not all California courts, however, have followed the
reasoning of the Fernald and McGraw decisions. The following two cases
illustrate situations in which the court refused to uphold a revocation
despite compliance with section 2280.
C. Rosenauer v. Title Ins. & Trust Co.
In Rosenauer v. Title Ins. & Trust Co.,56 the trustor executed an inter
vivos trust and provided therein that she could revoke the trust "at any
48. See id.
49. 66 Cal. App. 3d 399, 136 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1977); see supra, notes 9-16 and accompany-
ing text (discussion of Hibernia).
50. 72 Cal. App. 2d 390, 164 P.2d 846 (1945).
51. Id. at 395-96, 164 P.2d at 848-49.
52. Id. at 393, 164 P.2d at 847.
53. Id. at 399, 164 P.2d at 850-51.
54. 26 Cal. App. 2d 552, 79 P.2d 742 (1938); see discussion of Fernald, supra notes 40-49
and accompanying text.
55. Note that the McGraw case arose in the same appellate district as the next case discussed
in this section of the comment, Rosenauer v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 30 Cal. App. 3d 300,
106 Cal. Rptr. 321 (2d. Dist., 1973). As will be.discussed later in this comment, the Rosenauer
court refused to uphold a revocation complying only with section 2280, yet failed either to
discuss or overrule McGraw (72 Cal. App. 2d 390, 164 P.2d 846 (1945)). Therefore, even in
the same appellate district, the conflict identified in this comment appears to exist.
56. 30 Cal. App. 3d 300, 106 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1973).
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time during her lifetime ... by the Trustor's written instrument other
than a will filed with the Trustee"." 7 After the death of the trustor, the
executor of the estate delivered to the trustee a copy of the will of the
trustor, which purported to revoke the trust." Neither the will nor any
other writing purporting to be a revocation of the trust was delivered
to the trustee during the lifetime of the trustor5 9 The executor argued
that the revocation should be upheld because by executing a will during
life, the trustor effectively revoked any trust provisions that would have
been in effect upon death.6" The court, however, was apparently
motivated by concerns for preventing fraud and encouraging certainty
in property disposition, and therefore held that the revocation was
ineffective.
6'
The Rosenauer opinion, however, should not be extended un-
necessarily. First, the court actually was faced with the decision of
whether revocation had been accomplished pursuant to the trust terms
and did not need to address whether compliance with Civil Code sec-
tion 2280 alone would have been sufficient to work a revocation. The
rationale given by the Rosenauer court was that "[although] section
2280 was undoubtedly intended to liberalize the power of revocation
in California we do not believe it was intended to operate as a nullifica-
tion of a trustor's plainly expressed preference for a mode of revoca-
tion". 62 Despite rejecting the validity of the revocation in Rosenauer,
the reasoning of the Rosenauer court recognizes that the California
legislative approach to trust revocation under section 2280 embodies
a flexible approach toward trust construction. This principle of flex-
ibility leads to an inference that the courts, in construing the code
section, should adopt a flexible rather than strict approach toward
57. Id. at 301-02, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 321-22 (emphasis in original).
58. Id. at 302, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at, 305, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 323. As support for this holding, the Rosenauer court
relied primarily on the Restatement of Trusts (Second) §330(1), set forth supra n.28 and
two Massachusetts cases, Leahy v. Old Colony Trust Co., 326 Mass. 49, 93 N.E. 2d 238 (1950),
and Nat'l Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E. 2d 113 (1944). This reliance
is notable because these jurisdictions, unlike California, follow the majority view on revoca-
tion. Another commentator noted this "gap in logic" but felt that the Rosenauer result was
justified because the decision provides needed security for trustees. Bird, supra note 27, at
568. The Bird commentary emphasizes concern for the beneficiaries, an issue which is outside
the scope of this comment (id. at 54). The Rosenauer result may be justified on other grounds
as well, but those arguments do not affect the thesis advocated herein. See infra note 69 and
accompanying text.
62. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 304, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 323. Note that the Rosenauer court gave
no authority for the hyperbolic suggestion that, unless controlled, Civil Code section 2280 could
operate to defeat all trust revocation methods. Id. at 304.
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attempted revocations if the intent of the trustor to revoke is clear.
Other reasons suggest that Rosenauer should be limited to the facts
of the particular case. The language of the decision reveals an
unrealistic, misplaced respect for the intent of the trustor at the time
of trust creation, while ignoring the actual present intent of the trustor
at the time of attempted revocation.63 Additionally, Rosenauer also
attempted to recharacterize the argument of the plaintiff in favor of
revocation. This reasoning weakens the persuasive value of the deci-
sion. The court stated that the thrust of Civil Code section 2280 is
to remove any doubt concerning the revocability of a trust that is
silent on the subject of revocation .6  Revocability was not at issue
in Rosenauer. The method of revocation was actually in question.
Furthermore, the court also cautioned against construing section 2280
as an exclusive method of revocation when the trust contains a revoca-
tion procedure. 65 The plaintiff, however, had never contended that
Civil Code section 2280 was to be construed in that manner. This
contention was not needed to support the argument of the plaintiff
that revocation which satisfied the code was only one permissible
method as opposed to the exclusive method. 66 In addition, the
Rosenauer court did not address the reasoning used in Fernald, a case
addressing a similar issue .6 The hostility of the Rosenauer court toward
revocation pursuant to Civil Code section 2280 appears to have led
the court away from the main issue, which was not revocability but
rather the efficacy of an attempted revocation.
The most persuasive reason for limiting the application of the
language in Rosenauer is that the decision could have been reached
without ever discussing Civil Code section 2280. The trustor in
Rosenauer attempted to revoke an inter vivos trust by will. 68 Since
authorities disagree on whether a will can ever revoke an inter vivos
trust, 69 the court could have invalidated the revocation solely because
63. See infra note 118 and accompanying text (discussion of intent of trustor).
64. Rosenauer at 304, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
65. Id.
66. Note that even Fernald, which held that the code prevailed over a contrary trust revoca-
tion procedure, stopped short of attempting to characterize the code as an exclusive revocation
method.
67. Fernald, 26 Cal. App. 2d 552, 79 P.2d 742 (1938).
68. Rosenauer, 30 Cal. App. 3d at 303, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
69. Authorities disagree on whether a provision reserving a power of revocation empowers
the settlor to revoke by will as well as by inter vivos transaction. A. ScoT, THE LAW OF
TRusTs §330.8, at 2608 n.10 (Supp. 1984). The authorities denying revocation of inter vivos
trusts by will reason that a will is ineffective until the testator dies, and by that time the rights
of the beneficiaries have vested and the settlor no longer has any interest in the subject matter
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the trustor attempted to do so by will. Therefore, although Rosenauer
is supportable on the facts before that court, the result can become
harsh if extended to other situations. One example of this result is
found in Hibernia Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank.
D. Hibernia Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank
The Hibernia case presents several factors supporting a revocation70
made in compliance With section 2280, without increasing the possibility
of fraud or uncertainty in property disposition. The trust in Hibernia
contained a very complex revocation procedure. The trust could not
be revoked unless (1) the attorney of the trustor approved the revoca-
tion in writing; (2) a notice of revocation was signed by the trustor,
notarized, bore the written approval of the attorney of the trustor,
and was delivered to and received by the trustee; and (3) at least sixty
days elapsed after delivery to and receipt by the trustee of the notice
of revocation. 71
Twenty-two days after executing the trust, while confined to a con-
valescent hospital, the Hibernia trustor told three hospital employees
that she wanted to revoke her trust because she no longer desired
the primary beneficiary named in the trust agreement. 72 In the presence
of the hospital employees, the trustor signed a statement expressing
these wishes. 73 A few weeks later a conservator was appointed for
the trustor, and the attorney for the conservator immediately sent
the trustee a photocopy of the purported revocation together with
a letter expressing the consent of the conservator to revocation.74
Unfortunately, the trustor died fifteen days later, before the required
sixty-day waiting period had elapsed. 7 Litigation followed on the issue
to revoke. See Supreme Lodge of Fraternal Brotherhood v. Price, 27 Cal. App. 607, 623, 150
P. 803, 809 (1915); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §330 comment j (1957); see, e.g., Hill
v. Conover, 191 Cal. App. 2d 171, 183, 12 Cal. Rptr. 522, 529 (1961). But see Sanderson
v. Aubrey, 472 S.W. 2d 286, 288 (1971), wherein the Texas Court of Appeals upheld a revoca-
tion by will under a statute similar to CAL. CIV. CODE §2280, by applying the "dual character"
theory of wills. For more information on this theory, which considers wills to be testamentary
in part but operative in praesenti in others, see Note, The Revocation of an Inter Vivos Trust
by a Will, 24 BAYLOR L. REv. 274 (1972).
70. Hibernia, 66 Cal. App. 3d 399, 136 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1977); see supra notes 9-16 and
accompanying text (presenting the Hibernia case as an illustration of the conflict examined
in this comment).
71. Hibernia, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 402, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 401-02, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 61-62. Note that Civil Code section 2280 was satisfied
since the trustor had a written revocation delivered to the trustee. See supra notes 34-38 (discussion
of section 2280).
75. Hibernia, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 402, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
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of whether or not the actions of the trustor constituted a valid trust
revocation.
The special administrator of the estate of the trustor argued that
so long as section 2280 was satisfied, compliance with the entire trust
procedure was not necessary because that code section as interpreted
by Fernald provides a specific procedure for revoking a voluntary
trust that prevails over any agreement to the contrary between the
parties.77 Defendant trustee, on the other hand, resisted revocation
by arguing that (1) section 2280 was inapplicable to the trust involved
in the litigation;78 (2) Fernald was improperly reasoned;" 9 and (3) the
court should follow the Rosenauer interpretation of Civil Code sec-
tion 2280 rather than the interpretation of the Fernald court.8 " The
Hibernia court accepted the trustee's latter arguments and held the
attempted revocation invalid."' The result in Hibernia, however, con-
travened the clearly expressed intent of the trustor.
This comment proposes that the policies underlying section 2280
can support a more flexible approach, while still recognizing com-
peting goals of preventing fraud and encouraging certainty in prop-
erty disposition.8 ' The following section will show that the reasoning
of Hibernia is not persuasive and should therefore be discarded in
favor of the reasoning of Fernald and McGraw.
E. Analysis of Conflicting Case Law
The problem with the Hibernia decision is that the court
mischaracterized Fernald. The Hibernia court rejected Fernald in favor
of Rosenauer, but in order to do so the Fernald decision was
misconstrued. Moreover, the Hibernia criticisms of Fernald can be
rebutted.
First, Hibernia states that Fernald was not based upon precedent.
The reason for this may be that the Fernald court was the first to
address the issue after the applicable code section was amended
76. Fernald, 26 Cal. App. 2d at 561, 79 P.2d at 747 (1938); see also supra notes 40-49
and accompanying text.
77. Hibernia, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 403, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
78. The court disposed of this argument by noting that although California Civil Code
section 2250 appears to restrict the application of section 2280 to trusts created solely for the
benefit of another, the revocation of a trust creating a life estate in the trustor, as in Hibernia,
is also governed by section 2280.
79. Hibernia, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 402, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 62 (citing McGraw, 72 Cal. App.
2d at 399-400). Hibernia, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 403, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 404, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 63.
82. See supra note 4.
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effecting reversal of the law of revocability in California.83 Under
these circumstances, especially since the amendment embodied the
minority view in the United States, precedent directly on point is unlike-
ly to exist. Therefore, this criticism of Fernald alone is not convincing.
Second, the Hibernia court conceded that the law favors free
revocability of trusts in the interest of alienability of property but
argued that the alienability policy is not furthered by "denying" a
trustor the power to specify the manner of revocation. 4 The court
felt that the ultimate effect of Fernald was to require a trustor to
create either an irrevocable trust or one freely revocable upon written
notice.85 Application of the Fernald reasoning in proper circumstances,
such as the Hibernia case, would not have the effect of denying a
trustor the power to specify a revocation procedure when the trust
is created. The trustor remains free to specify any revocation method,
and revocation pursuant to Civil Code section 2280 would further
the policy of alienability the Hibernia court concedes is so impor-
tant. No support exists for giving more weight to policy considera-
tions such as alienability at the time the trust is created than at the
time the trust is revoked. The injustice that results is obvious in a
situation like that in Hibernia. In Hibernia, only twenty-two days had
elapsed since trust creation, the trustor clearly wished to revoke, and
she had substantially complied with the very complicated revocation
procedure specified in the trust.
Another reason given by the Hibernia court for rejecting Fernald
carries little weight. Hibernia stated that application of Fernald,
". .. would not allow [the trustor] to protect himself from the con-
sequences of his whim, caprice, momentary indecision, or of undue
influence by other persons." 86 One commentator suggests that if a
trustor creates a trust in a moment of wisdom for his own protec-
tion, he should not be permitted later in a "moment of folly" to
deprive himself of that protection. 7 The commentator responds that
if the trustor is the sole present beneficiary of the trust, as in Hiber-
nia, nobody but the trustor has any beneficial interest in the prop-
erty, and the trustor should be permitted to revoke the trust.8
83. Hibernia, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 404, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 63.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. The thrust of this argument is seriously weakened by recognition that these goals
can be achieved through creation of an irrevocable trust. A major feature of the revocable
trust is the potential to modify or terminate it if one wishes. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY at
1187 (5th. ed. 1979).
87. A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRusTs §339, at 2699 (1967).
88. Id.
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The Hibernia court, attempting to discredit the Fernald decision,
distinguished Fernald as involving a trustor as sole beneficiary, whereas
Hibernia involved a trustor as a life income beneficiary.89 However,
this attempt to draw a distinction was irrelevant, since, as the Hiber-
nia court conceded, revocation is governed by Civil Code section 2280
regardless of the interest of the trustor.90
Probably the weakest reason the Hibernia court gave for rejecting
Fernald was the statement that the "actual basis" for revocation of
the Fernald trust had been constructive fraud on the part of the
trustee. 9' Examination of the cited portions of the Fernald opinion
reveals that the Hibernia court recharacterized the basis of the Fer-
nald holding. The Fernald court only considered the constructive fraud
theory as an alternate theory for relief.
92
The reasons the Hibernia court gave for following the Rosenauer
precedent have some merit, but the reasons given for rejecting or
distinguishing Fernald are weak and rebuttable. In Rosenauer, the
trust specifically required revocation during the lifetime of the trustor.
Revocation, however, was attempted by will. 93 The Rosenauer situa-
tion raises fewer concerns about frustrating the intent of the trustor
since the trustor selected a relatively simple condition of revocation,
lifetime exercise of the power, but apparently made no attempt to
comply with that condition." In choosing to follow the more conser-
vative Rosenauer view, the Hibernia court gave almost no attention
to the equity and policy considerations present when a court is faced
with the validity of a trust revocation. 95 As compared to the Rosenauer
trustor, whose trust contained a relatively simple revocation condi-
tion, the ailing Hibernia trustor was less likely to have given much
89. Hibernia, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 405, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 63.
90. Id. at 404, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
91. Id. at 404, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 63.
92. After establishing that a confidential relationship existed between the trustor and trustee,
and that the trustee had refused to reconvey the trust property to the trustor upon request,
the Fernald court stated that in such circumstances constructive fraud is presumed. Fernald,
26 Cal. App. 2d at 562, 79 P.2d at 748. Describing the relief available in such circumstances,
the Fernald court said, ".-. equity will enforce a reconveyance of the property on the ground
of constructive fraud. Moreover, section 2280 of the Civil Code specifically provides for a
revocation of such a voluntary trust." Id. (emphasis added). The use of the word "moreover"
in that context indicates that the court in Fernald considered the Civil Code method of revoca-
tion a separate form of relief from the constructive fraud remedy.
93. Of course, if the trustor-testator had mistakenly thought execution of the will during
life would satisfy the lifetime revocation requirement, the court may have reached the opposite
conclusion. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
94. Rosenauer, 30 Cal. App. 3d at 303, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
95. See infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text (discussion of equity considerations);
infra notes 114-28 and accompanying text (discussion of policy considerations).
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reflection to the complex provisions of the legal documents she signed.
In light of the foregoing discussion, the Fernald decision appears
better reasoned than Hibernia. The rule of Fernald may be applied
without violating other principles of trust law. Furthermore, as will
be shown, the Fernald opinion comports with considerations of
statutory construction, equity and public policy.
APPLICATIONS OF CIVIL CODE SECTION 2280
A. Statutory Construction-Legislative Intent
Important rules of statutory construction, equitable considerations,
and policy factors all favor the Fernald/McGraw interpretation of sec-
tion 2280, allowing a trustor to revoke by satisfying the provisions
of that section even though contrary to trust terms. Several presump-
tions apply to legislative enactments. First, the law presumes that the
legislature did not intend to overthrow a valid legal principle, absent
a contrary expression in unmistakable language.9 6 Similarly, courts
will presume that the legislature never intends to do injustice, work
public inconvenience or private hardship.97 Therefore, section 2280
cannot be presumed to conflict with existing trust law considerations.
An accepted method of ascertaining legislative intent is to consider
the prevailing conditions that moved the legislature to enact a law. 9
The only source of information on legislative intent of 1931, when
Civil Code section 2280 was amended to its present version, is the
comparison of an earlier version of the bill to the enacted version 9
The earlier version did not specify any method of revocation, whereas
the enacted version provided that revocation would be by writing filed
with the trustee. This amendment demonstrates that the legislature
considered whether to specify a method in the legislation and decided
that the writing requirement was sufficient.
Similarly, the law presumes that the legislature intends that enact-
ments be in accord with settled principles of public policy.' 0 As an
aid in ascertaining legislative intent, the conditions surrounding the
act, history, and purposes may also be considered.'0' The sole amend-
96. F. McCAFRnY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §10, at 37 (1953).
97. Id., citing Gibson v. Jenney, 15 Mass. 205.
98. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 61, cited in F. MCCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTIUC-
TION §5, at 13.
99. 1931 Cal. Stat., c. 950, §1 at 1955 (amending CAL. Civ. CODE §2280).
100. F. MCCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §34, at 64 (1953). See infra notes 114-28
and accompanying text (discussion of policy factors).
101. F. MCCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §6, at 17.
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ment to Civil Code section 2280 in the 113-year history of the statute
not only set forth a revocation method but also reversed the majority
and common law view on revocability.10 2 Thus, the legislature must
have considered that the method set forth in the code section would
further important policy goals in the area of trust revocation.
1. Doctrines of Implications And Casus Omissus
The doctrine of implications is the method used to ascertain provi-
sions not specified in a statute but necessarily implied by the general
terms of the statute.' 3 The doctrine is an important principle of
statutory construction because what is necessarily implied is just as
much a part of the statute as what is expressly written therein,"0 ' The
doctrine, however, should be limited to strictly necessary incidents
or logical consequences of the statute as enacted,"0 ' The Rosenauer
case, for example, erroneously attempted to apply the doctrine, stating
that section 2280 applies only if the trust is silent or ambiguous re-
garding a revocation method.' 6 Since no legislative history was cited
to support this purported restriction upon the applicability of the code
sectidn, this interpretation cannot be said to represent a "necessary
incident or logical consequence" of the statute,
A similar doctrine used in statutory construction, vasus omissus,
refers to situations inadvertently omitted from the language of the
statute.' 7 Although the courts may interpret a code section to give
effect to what appears to be the general policy of the law, a casus
omissus cannot be supplied by the courts.' Thus, the courts cannot
presume that the legislature inadvertently failed to notice for over
half a century that the code section had been given an overbroad
scope. If the legislature had wished to restrict section 2280-to situa-
tions in which the trust fails to specify a revocation procedure, the
legislature could have done so,
B, Equitable Considerations
The rules of equity are more flexible than those of the common
102. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text, discussing majority view a xevoc bility.
103, F. McCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §6, at 16 (1953),
104. Id. (citing People v. Meakim, 133 NY. 214).
105, F. McCAFFrEY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §6, at 16, 21 (1953),
106, Rosenauer v. Title Ins. & Trust Co,, 30 Cal, App. 3d 300, 304, 106 ,Cal. Rptr, 32J,
323 (1973),
107. F. MCCAFFRxY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, §7, at 25 (19.53) (citing Mgcuskie v.
Hendrickson, 128 N,Y. 555). The rationale for this rule is that to permit the courts to enlarge
legislation would be a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Ad.
108. F. McCAF.REY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §7, at 25 (1953),
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law, and the courts have greater discretion in administering equitable
remedies than common law remedies."0 9 Therefore, application of
equitable principles to trust revocation requirements will promote the
chief goal of equity, namely, achievement of justice in any particular
case." Although equitable and common law remedies are now ad-
ministered by a single court system, equity continues to exist as a
separate system of rights, remedies and procedure, modifying com-
mon law remedies when necessary."'
Equity principles can be applied in trust litigation because trust law
was included in the English common law scheme of equity
jurisprudence, which was adopted by the American courts." ' Trust
law has solid foundations in equity and therefore equitable principles
are appropriately considered in determining the validity of a trust
revocation.' Cases ignoring equitable considerations are more likely
to reach an unfair result in the trust revocation context. Although
"equitable considerations" are hard to define, courts generally strive
to achieve the most fair result in the particular case. A fair result
is within the broad discretionary power of the court, based on a tradi-
tion of applying equitable principles to trust cases.
C. Policy Factors
A key principle in modern property law is the assumption that
freedom to alienate property interests is essential to the welfare of
society." ' The rationale for this policy has been stated in several ways.
First, society should be maintained and controlled primarily by living
members. Second, the current use of wealth should be facilitated.
Third, property should be kept responsive to the needs of the current
beneficial owners." 5 California likewise favors free alienability of pro-
perty and free revocability of trusts by the trustor."16 Therefore, judicial
109. H. MCCLINTOCK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY §1, at 2 (1948).
110. Id.
111. Id. §7, at 16.
112. G. BOrERT, LAW OF TRUSTS §6, at 14 (1973).
113. Id.
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, Donative Transfers, at 143 (1983).
115. Id. at 10. For an expanded discussion of the rationale, see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF PROPERTY, Perpetuities and Other Social Restraints, Part I, Introductory Note, at 2129-33.
116. Bixby v. Calif. Trust Co., 33 Cal. 2d 495, 498, 202 P.2d 1018, 1019 (1949) (trustor
who was sole beneficiary could compel termination of trust in the absence of a showing of
incapacity or other reason why trustor should not be permitted to exercise control over trust
property); see also Heifetz v. Bank of America, 147 Cal. App. 2d 776, 785, 305 P.2d 979,
985 (1957) (trustor had right to make self and daughter sole beneficiaries, to exclusion of all
other remaindermen, then terminate trust with consent of daughter); Fernald, 26 Cal. App.
2d at 560, 79 P.2d at 747 (1938) (trust revocable because revoked pursuant to Civil Code sec-
tion 2280, which prevailed over contrary revocation method set forth in trust instrument).
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decisions that have the effect of restraining the power of a trustor
to alienate property are contrary to strong public policy goals.
Although free alienability must sometimes be limited in order to
protect the expectancies of other persons, this limit has not always
defeated the power to alienate property. For example, a trustor may
lawfully exercise any right of revocation or amendment found within
the four corners of the trust instrument without regard to the effects
on rights of remaindermen, since no duty is owed them to refrain
from exercising any reserved right." ' This principle supports the con-
cept of flexible alienability. Since a California trustor has the right
to eliminate all beneficiaries and revoke at any time, courts need not
deny revocation by the procedure specified in section 2280 in order
to protect the rights and expectations of beneficiaries and re-
maindermen. Encouraging the goal of free alienability does not hinder
the contrary policy of encouraging certainty in property disposition,
in light of the very important policy of respecting the intent of the
trustor to revoke.
Closely related to the policy of free alienability is the principle that
the intention of the trustor should control, unless contrary to another
compelling public policy." 8 In practice, this principle means that a
trustor should be able to dispose of property freely. The initial inten-
tion of the trustor to impose conditions on trust revocability should
not preclude the trustor from effecting a valid revocation by section
2280 should that intention change.
The weight of authority, including California" 9 and the Restate-
ment of Trusts,2 0 suggests that a settlor who is the sole beneficiary
can revoke his trust at any time, absent a showing of incapacity or
other sufficient reason, even though the trust purposes have not been
accomplished fully.' 2' Since a settlor who is also the sole beneficiary
117. Heifetz, 147 Cal. App. 2d at 783, 305 P.2d at 983-84.
118. A. ScoTT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS §337, at 2655 (1967); see also United Cal. Bank v.
Bottler, 16 Cal. App. 3d 610, 618-19, 94 Cal. Rptr. 227, 232 (1971). One law review note criticizes
the harshness of a Wisconsin decision that refused to uphold a revocation when the only condi-
tion not met was the failure of one trustee to sign the revocation notice until after his return
from Europe, by which time the trustor had passed away. The note suggested that concepts
of "strict" or "liberal" construction are irrelevant to considerations of trust revocation methods
that do not comply exactly with the trust terms. Further, the note suggested that absent a
clear public policy, an instrument should be construed to effectuate the intent of the parties
rather than test for strict compliance with the trust terms. This approach is especially valid
when the only unmet condition was concurrence by one trustee, since the lack of such concur-
rence is immaterial to the question of the intent of the settlor. Note, Trusts - Exercise of
Power of Revocation, 26 MICH. L. REV. 586 (1928).
119. Bixby, 33 Cal. 2d at 497, 202 P.2d at 1018-19.
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §339 and comment a (1957).
121. A. SCOTT, Ti LAW OF TRUSTS §339, at 2694 (1967).
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can revoke the trust at any time for any reason, language in cases
refusing to uphold a revocation that satisfied section 2280 because
of concerns with protecting trustors from their own folly are being
overly cautious and provide only illusory protection. Additionally, such
results may actually punish the trustor for inserting a revocation
method. No one else is affected by revocation, especially if the trustor
is the sole beneficiary, and revocation should be granted regardless
of compliance with the trust revocation terms.
1. Provisions Solely For Benefit Of Trustee
In the Hibernia case used for illustration earlier in this comment,' 2
the trustor not only satisfied section 2280, but also substantially com-
plied with the trust revocation terms. The revocation did not comply
with the terms requiring notice to and approval by the trustee, and
an unelapsed time period.' 23 This type of time period requirement
typically operates as a notice period for the trustee. One commen-
tator suggests that a revocation may be upheld despite a lack of ex-
act compliance with trust terms if the only conditions not satisfied
are those intended merely for the protection of the trustee.' 4 If the
only unsatisfied trust terms are of this type, revocation should be
upheld so long as the trustor has complied with section 2280.
2. Substance Over Form
If the trustor has substantially complied with the trust terms and
Civil Code section 2280 has been satisfied, the equitable principle of
substance over form provides an additional reason for upholding the
revocation. For example, in Duncan v. Kahn,'25 a trustee failed to
sign the termination notice but performed all other acts sufficient to
constitute ratification of the notice. 6 The court held that a denial
of the termination would be "hypertechnical." '27 This'holding il-
lustrates the policy of giving effect to substance over form in legal
122. See supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text (presentation of Hibernia case to illustrate
the conflict examined in this comment).
123. Hibernia, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 402, 403, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
124. A. ScoTT, Tm LAw or TRusTs §330.8, at 2608 (1967). Note that Scott makes this
statement even without considering the availability of a provision like Civil Code section 2280.
The existence of this code section reinforces the Scott argument by providing added assurance
of satisfying the intent of the trustor and meeting the Statute of Frauds.
125. 151 Cal. App. 2d 402, 311 P.2d 587 (1957).
126. Id. at 404, 311 P.2d at 589.
127. Id. at 406, 311 P.2d at 590.
1986 / Trust Revocation
transactions, and supports the flexible approach to trust revocation
advocated by this comment.' 28
CONCLUSION
This comment has discussed the conflict existing in California con-
cerning the validity of a trust revocation that complies with section
2280 but does not comply with the trust terms. Selected cases have
indicated the harshness of requiring strict compliance with the trust
terms in certain situations. Trust law rules were set forth and applied
to Civil Code section 2280. Based on principles of statutory construc-
tion, equity, and public policy, this comment has argued that a revoca-
tion should be effective when Civil Code section 2280 is satisfied and
revocation would serve these well-settled principles, even though the
trust revocation method was not strictly followed.
Application of the more flexible approach to revocation will not
hinder competing interests of defeating fraud and encouraging cer-
tainty in property disposition, so long as Civil Code section 2280 is
satisfied and other appropriate equity and policy factors exist. Fac-
tors in favor of permitting revocation based on compliance with Civil
Code section 2280 include rules of statutory construction leading to
presumptions that the legislature intended to recognize public policy
and avoid injustice in enacting the statute. Equitable foundations of
trust law, including concerns of fairness, also support a flexible ap-
proach toward alienation. Finally, recognized policy goals encourage
free alienability of property and respect for the intent of the settlor.
Section 2280 provides sufficient safeguards to rebut competing con-
siderations, and revocation pursuant to the code section will achieve
the better result in many trust revocation situations.
Linda A. MacRae
128. Professor Powell suggests that strict formalism in trust revocation "is justifiable only
to the extent that it assures clarity in an act which operates to change the rights of parties."
4 R. PowELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §565, at 428.40(1) (rev. ed. 1981). Formalism would
not appear to be justified, especially if the only party affected by a revocation is the settlor.
See id.
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